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Financial Aspects of the
Automobile Problem
By ROBERT C. GosHAY AND ALFRED E. HOFFLANDER*
THE "AUTOMOBILE PROBLEM"
The increasing social and economic importance of the auto-
mobile and its attendant private and public cost have worked to
place automobile liability insurance in a special legislative and
judicial category. This is not a recent development. Fifty years
ago, legislatures considered proposals to place the automobile
owner in a special financial responsibility status with respect to
his legal liabilities. Case law had already developed; legislative
proposals then and since have arisen from the general acceptance
of the very serious social and econ6mic effects of the automobile
on one hand, and on the other, the great gap between the legal
responsibility of an owner for accidents and his willingness or
ability to be financially responsible.
Since the advent of the automobile, a variety of solutions to
fill this gap has been proposed; a fewer number have been tried.
Compulsory insurance has been one; financial responsibility laws
another. The two represent the bulk of the solutions in the
United States. More recently, proposals have been made for
compensation systems which, wholly or in part, replace the use
of the negligence concept as a basis for the payment of victims of
automobile accidents.
Thus we have, today, what is loosely termed the "automobile
problem." To some, it is a condemnation of the tort system in
terms of its (alleged) inherent delay, unreliability, dependence
on juries, failure to encourage rehabilitation, dominance by in-
surers, high cost of administration, and lack of integrity in general
in its treatment of automobile related costs of injuries. Others
concur, but emphasize the faults of the physical environment of
* The authors are Associate Professors of Business Administration, University
of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, respectively.
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the automobile's use, the adequacy of the highway system, the
safety and maintenance of automobiles, the licensing of vehicles
and drivers, and the enforcement of motor vehicle laws. Particular
emphasis is placed by some on the need for political statesmanship
and leadership. The nature of the problem can be defined from
the view of many: government, consumer groups, insured
motorists, non-insured motorists, manufacturers, and the in-
surance industry, to mention a few. It is the latter's view which
we propose to examine in this paper, with particular emphasis on
the ability and/or willingness of insurers to fill the gap between
the accident and financial responsibility.
THE "CAPACITY PROBLEM"
We believe it somewhat evident that in a competitive system,
wherein insurance companies individually proceed to the public
in quest of the sale of profitable insurance, one segment of the
market, for a number of reasons, will not purchase. This segment
of the market will not purchase because it is not asked to pur-
chase, because it considers the purchase price as exorbitant, or
unduly discriminatory, or because it is not financially responsible.
A lack of financial resources may also be a crucial reason. The
automobile problem in this sense is the uninsured segment of the
market.
Much of the controversy concerning automobile insurance
centers about the willingness and ability of the insurance industry
to offer insurance at a "reasonable" price to this segment of the
market (and the entire market, for that matter) in return for a
"fair profit." This controversy is termed the "capacity" problem,
to connote outward conditions or circumstances under which
the insurance industry will supply (half dragged and half lured,
perhaps) insurance.'
Insurers are placed in an extremely difficult position as
financial intermediaries. They recognize that from a practical
viewpoint, automobile insurance, generally, is regarded as a form
of social insurance. Further, they recognize that there is a political
1 An excellent point for departing on a study of the automobile problem is
C. Ku-L, & J. HALL, CASUALTY INsmRAxcE (1968), chapters 10, 11, 12, and 13.
This is the most complete statement of the automobile problem and its relation to
insurers which is presently available.
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ceiling on automobile costs, as well as great pressures to provide
for more extensive coverage of motorists. Their fear of com-
pulsory insurance law continues, of course, but more important,
they seem trapped by their internal structure in a rapidly
changing external environment. Internally, they regard auto-
mobile insurance as a consistently unprofitable line, and have
chosen to control costs through the medium of selective under-
writing.2 While their rate making bases, as promulgated by rating
bureaus or their individual devices, may be drawn in a fashion
which does not unduly discriminate, their underwriting need not
and usually is not drawn randomly from these bases. In many
property-casualty lines, individual insurers have "curfews" which
either severely restrict the types of risks they will accept or pro-
hibit entirely certain types of risks. These curfews, which
comprise a number of underwriting tactics, are well known to
sales forces, but are not easy to document. Cancellation, non-re-
newals, arbitrary rate increases based on accident involvement and
other practices are tactics which contribute to the belief of many
that insurers do not provide a market (or "capacity") according
to the needs of the public.
The insurers justify their practices on profit maximization
grounds. They do not consider themselves as public utilities,
despite such views by the public. They are unwilling to under-
write without a profit allowance.3 Expressed in these terms,
insurers are financially unwilling to extend themselves by ag-
gressively marketing in currently uninsured areas. To do so would
2 Insurers have attempted to reduce costs by methods other than selective
underwriting. Marketing expense is a notable area.
8 Some insurers have abandoned this view:
State Farm has long felt the traditional industry arguments against
inclusion of investment income in rate making served only to make
regulators and the public suspicious of our motives and operations.
Under obscure rituals by which rates are currently approved in ac-
cordance with formulae fixing arbitrary profit factors, it is un-
realistic to include investment income. But in measuring a com-
pany's performance, income from all sources, including investment
income, must be considered. . . . Market place competition will
require due consideration by management of all relevant factors in
the making of rates. Income from investment is certainly one of
the most important of these factors. (Testimony of Donald P.
McHugh to United States Senate Subcommittee on Anti-Trust
and Monopoly, January, 1969. Mr. McHugh is an officer of State




be unprofitable. Moreover, they allege their ability to under-
write is, or would be, impaired since their solvency would be
questioned. There are these two major dimensions, then, of the
capacity problem-financial unwillingness and/or financial in-
ability. Whichever is dominant has major implications for the
future of the privately operated automobile insurance industry.
FINANCIAL ABILITY AND INSOLVENCY
It may be that the insurance industry is unable to aggressively
market automobile insurance in the uninsured segments because
it fears financial insolvency collectively and individually. This
raises most difficult questions. One is whether or not under-
writing in this segment is unprofitable, and, if so, whether or not
the cause is the inability of insurers to price in this segment. The
answer to this question involves an intensive analysis of the nature
of the ratemaking process as well as insurer motives. While such
analysis is pertinent, we propose to treat a question more germane
to a financial discussion, that of determining the proper means
for evaluating the financial solvency of insurers. Rate regulation,
in whatever form, aims at producing a rate structure which is suf-
ficient to cover losses and expenses without endangering solvency.
(Other forms of regulation address solvency questions as well.)
Despite announced goals of rate regulation to produce a rate
structure which is adequate, not excessive, and not unfairly dis-
criminatory, some believe that the causes of insolvency are only
related distantly to rate regulation. Other factors, perhaps manage-
ment dishonesty and incompetence, for example, must play a
major role, since it is possible to demonstrate, theoretically, that
an increase in rate levels would not appreciably decrease the rate
of insolvency. Which factors dominate need not be addressed, yet
in any case, determinations of solvency of individual insurers will
be made by regulatory authorities. What is desired is a measure of
solvency which provides assurance of financial ability to respond
by the insurer at least in time to detect and prevent loss to the
policyholder.
Unfortunately, despite refinements in ratemaking classifica-
tions and development of data bases and analytic techniques, tests
of financial solvency of insurers are crude, perhaps necessarily so.
Three financial measures seem to be used by regulatory authori-
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ties, industry analysts, and insurance management: debt/equity,
sales/equity, and liability composition and flow measures.
The ratio of debt to equity, so common in financial analysis
generally, where debt is considered to be loss reserves and un-
earned premium liabilities of the insurer and equity as every-
thing in the net worth section (whether the insurer is stock or
mutual in form), is said to be a principal administrative tool of
regulators. It is basically a leverage measure. As such, it cannot
be separated from profitability of any firm, one of the things which
influences the willingness of the industry to offer insurance. How-
ever, this ratio or variants of it is viewed as surrogate for solvency
on the grounds that beyond certain ratios, technical insolvency,
arising from regulatory intervention, or even actual insolvency
may result from the insufficiency of the equity base to absorb
fluctuations in operating experience. The ratio, in insurance
terms, measures the number of dollars of insurers' obligations to
underlying equity.
Historically, this ratio has been fairly constant for the industry
and for most individual insurers,4 although it rises during pros-
perity and falls during adverse periods. The problem with the
ratio is that it is a crude measure and ignores profitability of the
insurance underwritten, the quality of the assets, and due to
statutory accounting requirements, the rate of growth of the in-
surer. The problems associated with its lag alone are almost suf-
ficient to discredit it as a viable surrogate for solvency. Nonethe-
less, the constancy of the ratio for the industry over time has some
interesting implications. One is that insurers have expanded their
liabilities only in proportion to the growth of their equity posi-
tions, which for the most part has been through investment pro-
fits and some underwriting profits. In the last decade there has
been practically no infusion of equity funds from the capital
markets. The constancy of this ratio has continued during great
pressure to expand and innovate in underwriting; in other words,
one aspect of the capacity problem, the possible financial insol-
vency of insurers, cannot be identified in terms of the aggregate
obligations of insurers in relation to their net worth. If the
danger of financial insolvency were increasing, one might expect




some movement of the ratio to reflect a change in underlying
conditions, but none has appeared yet.
The argument can be made that the quality of the liabilities of
the insurer is markedly changed, and that this explains the
constancy of the debt/equity ratios of insurers over the past
years. Support for this view would involve the belief that the
potential exposure in stated liabilities, although unrecorded in
financial statements, has offset what would otherwise be more
debt (underwriting) in the financial structure. Unfortunately,
temporal analysis does not support this view. Were liabilities in
fact of more volatile character (and skewed on the loss side), their
volatility would have resulted in lower unearned premiums and
reserves relative to net worth long before now. Of course, the
character of an insurer's liabilities are of concern to regulatory
authorities, but there is no benchmark or "ratio" connoting
solvency or adequacy of unearned premium or loss reserves except
the obvious one: are reserves sufficient as they are used up over
time? Generally, insurers attempt to establish reserves at a level
which is sufficient to meet losses, yet not distort experience of
future conditions. Research in this area is sparse for all insurers,
but most authorities agree that the administrative rulings and
laws governing reserve valuations encourages underreservinge-
the establishment of liabilities which are less over time than the
amount which will be needed for their discharge. Some of this
underreserving (primarily of loss reserves) may represent a sort
of offset to overvaluation of unearned premium reserves (the
latter is inherent in property-casualty insurance accounting con-
ventions). Likewise, some of it may be due to a fear of incurring
tax penalties for overreserving, or fear of jeopardizing future rate
increases or undue distortion of current earnings figures.6 Per-
tinent to this discussion, however, is what we believe to be an
obvious implication of the underreserving practice. It seems
illogical to argue that insurers fear insolvency (as a reason for
not aggressively marketing among uninsured segments) when
their practice in establishing reserves is to underestimate. Indeed,
one might expect the opposite practice in the face of insolvency
fears: overreserving.
5 C. KuLp & J. HALL, supra note 1, at 1016.6 Some regulatory authorities believe underreserving is more often than not
continued unwarranted optimism of claims managers about future losses.
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Fear of insolvency among insurers might be explained to the
extent that insolvencies occur at a high frequency in the industry.
But, alas, research in this area is fragmentary too. One recent
study,7 admittedly based on limited available data, suggests that
while entry and exit to the property-casualty insurance industry
may be "high"-as much as 1% annually of the number of com-
panies, and as much as 10% of the companies writing "high risk"
automobile insurance-the rate of insolvency is far less, perhaps by
one-half. Over the past few years, insolvency seems "normally" to
run about 0.5 per cent annually, on the basis of 4,000 companies.
More important, unpaid claims as a percentage of total premiums
(1960-65) have been estimated at only about $17 million. While
this study is replete with caveats concerning the uneasiness of the
data base, one might conclude that the rate of insolvency among
property-casualty insurers is insufficient as a base to generate
widespread fears of insolvency in the industry.
A third measure which is used by many as an indicator of
the solvency position of fire-casualty insurers is a ratio of sales/net
worth. In insurance terms, premiums -written to policyholders'
surplus is the measure. Its significance rests on an assumption that
liabilities of insurers grow in relation to premiums written and
should be evaluated in terms of the underlying equity base.
Further, the significance of the ratio rests on an assumption that
rapid upward changes in the ratio signals potential financial
danger. This ratio is also crude, but purportedly has been pro-
posed as a guideline for inclusion in several state laws as not to
exceed 2:1 for automobile insurers and 1:1 for property insurers.
But if it is thought of as a measure of the cushion for the volume
of unexpected losses, then its historical value is in terms of the
direction it suggests for increasing or decreasing solvency of in-
surers. Without extending ourselves too far with data, one should
note that from 1957 to 1967, the ratio of written insurance pre-
miums to policy-holders surplus for stock insurers fell from 1.22
to 1.01. Although changes in this ratio also reflect movements in
stock market values, the decrease has been significant (there have
been no major accounting changes to account for it) .Its direction
suggests less underwriting; that is, that insurers write less business
7 W. NoRHAus, INSOLVENCY IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTY, (1967) (privately
published and distributed Working Memorandum No. 22, Case 69021).
1969]
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now than they did in the past, relative to equity. This is despite
much research which has speculated that the ratio should indeed
have moved in the other direction, reflecting in some degree the
broadening of underwriting powers of insurance companies since
1950. The movement from single-line operation to multiple-line
operation should have increased the underwriting capacity of
insurers, if for no other reason than on the grounds that ad-
ditional or broadened actuarial bases become available. For the
last year for which data are available (1967) the ratio of premi-
ums written to net worth for all insurers was about 1.4. It would
appear then that the insurance industry as a whole is not in
violation of policyholders surplus "guidelines", but rather is
highly conservative relative to historical norms. When one ex-
amines large individual companies, the disparity between what
they could write in terms of premium volume and what they do
write is even greater. Increases in premiums by a magnitude of
four or five times present volume is easily conceivable.
The result of such limitation of underwriting, of course, is
restricted capacity, with many needed insurance services ap-
parently not being provided or provided in inadequate amounts,
and, on the other hand, substantial amounts of capital which are
not being utilized to support insurance purposes. Many companies
have more capital than they need to support their own insurance
operations.
Taking these three measures into consideration (the ratios of
debt to equity, and premiums to equity, and those pertaining to
under-reserving), can the fear of financial insolvency be cited as a
reason for the inability of insurance companies to extend-ag-
gressively market-coverages to the motoring public? Alternately
expressed, is there an inability to extend insurance, and is it
related to financial insolvency? We think not, to both questions.
FINANCIAL WILLINGNESS
We believe the present capacity problem exists because the in-
dustry is convinced that the automobile insurance business is un-
profitable, and, further, is convinced it does not have the means
to make it profitable. Insurers believe if they aggressively market
this business, they would do so at a loss. But operating at a loss to
the insurance industry means something different than operating
at a loss to others. Insurance company profitability is made up of
[Vol. 57,
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two elements, underwriting and investment. How well an in-
surance company does depends on how profitably these joint ele-
ments are combined. But, this is where problems arise. Insurance
company management insists that it is in the business of providing
insurance (narrowly defined to include underwriting but not
investing) and so it is entitled to, or rather must, make an
underwriting profit. The analogous situation in the banking in-
dustry can be speculated: a bank should make a profit on the
checking services as well as on investing, both for the benefit of
stockholders. (Banks seem to have given up in large part the
desire for check service revenues in the competition for deposit
funds.) What makes insurers particularly distinct from other
industries is that the pricing system, regulated after a fashion, has
a history of permitting the inclusion of an underwriting profit.
The "demand" for underwriting profit is near universal, and is
shared and fostered by stock analysts."
The reason insurance company management has this view is
simple, when stripped of institutional trimmings. When a manu-
facturer prices his product (no matter on what basis), he expends
resulting revenues on labor, raw materials, and plant and equip-
ment, hoping for a return to equity which is favorable. On the
other hand, when the insurer prices his product (no matter on
what basis), he expends resulting revenues on losses and expenses
and on investments, which in turn produce revenues. The insurer,
too, hopes for a return to equity which is favorable, but differs
from the manufacturer in that he has two sources of revenue
rather than one. Naturally, he attempts (one way or another) to
turn a profit from both sources, and becomes (at a minimum)
perplexed at those who question his right to do so, or suggest that
the sources should be offsetting. The internal structure of the
industry is sufficient to assure this managerial attitude will con-
tinue for a considerable period in the future.
The prevalence of this belief is so strong that loss of under-
writing profit usually results in restrictive underwriting, the
development of a capacity problem. When underwriting is re-
stricted, it obviously affects the growth of net worth, which in
turn means the business cannot grow through retained earnings.
S Lack of underwriting profit is deemed a sure sign of poor management The
reader is referred to any investment service reports, except for the last year or two.
19691
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Is the insurance business, especially automobile insurance, un-
profitable? It seems essential to analyze this link in the capacity
problem. In response to this question, a number of studies have
been made. One, an industry supported study," employed various
measures to estimate risk and return to the industry and alleged
that the industry is unprofitable and "under earning," in relation
to other industries with similar characteristics. Reviews of this
particular study have been a trifle scathing in questioning its
methodological foundations, statistical analyses, and conclusions. 10
What is curious with respect to this study in particular and other
studies of the profit phenomenon or lack of it, in general, is the
very conflicting evidence gathered by parties as to the degree to
which the insurance industry, particularly automobile insurance,
is profitable. Staff reports to legislative committees, 1 testimony by
experts and independent studies by academics conflict to the point
where a student of the controversy becomes convinced that no
course other than additional (his own) investigation can possibly
furnish meaningful light on the question.
We do not wish to contribute yet another attempt to answer
the profitability measurement question, despite the fact that the
profitability level of the industry has profound implications. "Low
profits," for example, may be sufficient reason for drastic revision
of investment and rate-making laws which apply to insurers, since
these laws may be the causes of restricted underwriting and,
hence, the basic source of lack of capacity. On the other hand, high
profits, however defined, would generate considerable suspicion
about insurer motives and the ratemaking process vis-a-vis their
public posture to underwrite risks at a "fair" profit. What we
believe is important, however, is that the reader appreciate the
9 PwcEs AND PRoFrs 3N THE PROPERTY AND IABmIrrl INSURANCE INDUSTRY,
A REPORT To THE AmEnrcAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION (1967).
1OHammond & Shilling, Report Review, 36 J. RisK & INs. 129 (1969)-
Hofflander & Mason, Report Review, 35 J. Ris & INS. 293 (1968); R. Norgaid
& G. Schick, Profitability in the Property and Liability Insurance Industry, Dec.,
1968 (unpublished manuscript, University of Southern California).
1 1 STAFF OF ANTrrRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE ColMM. ON THE JUDIcLARY, HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATrVES, 90TH CONG., IST Sass., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE STUDY
(1967); Hearings Before the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968). In C. KUWP & J. HALL,
supra note 1, the author repeatedly refers to the unprofitability of casualty in-
surers. Another government study, on the other hand, apparently authored by
academics, considers the industry as profitable. See PnEsimrrs NATIONAL An-
VISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIoT-AFFECTED ARAS, MEETING THE INSURANCE
CRmSIS OF OtR Cr=rs (1968).
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nature of the questions which must be addressed to examine the
profitability of any industry.
Initially, profitability can be measured on a number of bases:
the rate of return on total assets or equity (market value or book
value?), or on sales (underwriting: premiums written or premi-
ums earned?); performance of the common stocks of insurers is
another logical base (capital gains and/or dividends? How does
one weight the components?). If the interest is in the profitability
of the automobile insurance industry, then questions arise as to
how profitability should be measured for mutual insurance com-
panies, where no market values for equity appear and where
dividends to policyholders may be a practice. Indeed, can profi-
tability of automobile insurance be studied separately from all
insurance? In any event, can the operations of insurers be studied
effectively at all with respect to profitability without submerging
the automobile insurance portions?
Presuming these questions can be or are answered to the
satisfaction of a majority, can comparative profitability be estab-
lished in reference to the returns "in other enterprises having cor-
responding risks?" The problems in defining corresponding risks
are not new (public utility regulators have struggled in this area),
but they are most minor as problems compared to those of
developing statistically (and convincingly) a measure of risk. If
statistical data are used, should they be temporally or spatially
developed in their measure of risk and return, and over what time
periods? Should they involve simple means or variances, or more
sophisticated measures of risk? Finally, when completing con-
sideration of such risk-return relationships, do "conclusions"
emanating reveal no more than differences in managerial ability
or "true" risk-return differences, intra-industry and inter-industry?
Profitability conclusions must be interpreted in terms of an as-
sumption about the nature of insurance company management.
Suppose that insurance management is highly homogeneous, par-
ticularly the stock fire and casualty segment, and has followed not
some maximizing behavior in profitability decision-making, but
some sort of an institutional behavior, reflecting its views of what
should be the underlying characteristics of its common stock
equities (mutual company management may operate similarly) in
terms of risk-return characteristics. This supposition would mean
1969]
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that all insurance company managements (consciously or other-
wise) have aimed at producing common stock values in the
market which have the same risk-return characteristics. (For the
image it leaves with the regulatory authorities might be one ex-
planation for this behavior.) If this were the case, then risk-return
analysis, based on market value performance of the underlying
equities, would largely be meaningless, insofar as it would be self-
inflicted.12
These questions are meant to be only suggestive and not ex-
haustive. They should reveal that there are no simple answers to
the profitability questions, despite their profound implications to
the insurance environment.
What seems very peculiar in the flurry of studies, data and
criticisms on the profitability of this industry, particularly with
respect to the automobile segment, is the scant attention cur-
rently given to the performance of common stocks of insurance
companies and the implications of the widespread financial
reorganizations. Each of these deserves some comment.
The ultimate test of profitability must be in the market place,
at least for stock insurance companies. It is perplexing to note
again and again in the press, and in insurance company statistical
services, that property-casualty insurers have had a period of
underwriting grief since about 1955. Yet, rising market prices of
their asset portfolios and the attendant rising investment income
have managed to finance more than a doubling of assets, surplus
and premiums. "Thus, despite profitless underwriting, the in-
dustry has enjoyed a measure of prosperity and has been able to
maintain a generally sound financial structure."'13 The market for
insurance company stocks has reacted. We chose not to present a
statistical study of the phenomena, but the Best Insurance Stock
Index (30 stocks, 1956-66) has had an annual growth of ap-
proximately 9% per year, while Standard and Poor's 500 stocks has
grown an average of 5.5 % per year. Others have claimed that large
multiple line as well as specialty automobile insurance companies
have made exceptionally high average profits, based on a study of
641 major American non-insurance companies and 25 insurance
12Such a theory of institutional behavior is suggested, not posited, in
Michaelson & Goshay, Portfolio Selection in Financial Intermediaries: A New
Approach, 2 J. FiNA cAL. & QuANTrrAT v E Ar L-ss, (1967).
13 Preface to BEST'S DiGEST OF INsURaANCE STOCKS (36th ed. 1966).
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companies over the 1953-67 period.14 On the other hand, from this
same study, the average trend in insurance profits seems to be
down over the past 15 years, being most pronounced among auto-
mobile insurance underwriters. Yes, the data, studies and criticism
conflict.
We seem to reach necessarily the conclusion that the pro-
fitability question is unresolved. What appears to be happening
is that several groups are trying to demonstrate that the industry
is not profitable, possibly for political and regulatory reasons,
while other groups-mostly consumer and academic in composi-
tion-are claiming it is profitable, or that the conclusions of the
former are in error, without developing the "true" picture. Un-
derlying, of course, is a continued and acknowledged condition of
the industry: lack of capacity.
Financial reorganizations have played a prominent role in the
insurance industry over the last decade, particularly the last few
years. Mergers between insurance companies have been several,
but mergers between insurers and non-insurers have been con-
spicuous. In fact, much of the favorable performance of the com-
mon stocks of insurers over the last few years has been of a
speculative nature, related to the formation of insurance holding
companies and their subsequent merger with industrial and
financial conglomerates.' 5 Does this phenomenon relate to the
profitability of insurance companies and to the lack of insurance
capacity? We think it does. The explanation of the merger-holding
company "movement" in the property-liability industry must be
based on some sort of mutual attraction. It appears to us that this
attraction is to a large part a function of different perceptions of
the profitability of insurance companies, and that this difference in
perception may well be a crucial issue.
Foremost among these perceptions is that the property-liability
industry believes its earnings record has been consistently sub-
standard, has worsened substantially in recent years, and is not
likely to improve in the foreseeable future. The market price of
14 R. Norgaard & G. Schick, supra note 10.15 The spectacular gains of common stocks in the property-liability field in
1968 were sparked by takeovers and mergers. Best's Property-Liability Stock Index
surged ahead by 72.5% compared with a loss of 24% in 1967. Big gainers were




property-liability insurance company stocks has reflected the de-
pressed level of earnings as perceived by management and in-
surance stock analysts. In many instances the price of insurance
company common stocks have been selling below their liquidating
value.' 6 This encouraged individuals and companies to seek to
purchase such stocks at bargain prices to gain access to insurance
company assets. Following this line of reasoning to its logical
conclusion, what one might expect to be happening would be
that each insurance company taken over through a merger or
by conglomerate acquisition would be liquidated in order to
pirate its assets. As a matter of fact, this has not occurred in the
majority of instances if any. What has happened is that the
acquired companies have had their "excess surplus" drained down
to some minimum level.' 7 The resulting funds are then passed on
to the parent company for reinvestment elsewhere.
It is possible for one to draw at least two conclusions from
what is occurring. First, in the minds of those who are seeking to
acquire insurance companies, the insurers are over-capitalized. As
such, they are an excellent source of instant funds (excess sur-
plus). The second conclusion arises from the absence of liquida-
tion: the acquiring firm must view the insurance company as
being useful (i.e. profitable) as an ongoing firm as well as a
source of instantaneous cash. If it did not feel this way, it would
be advantageous to liquidate the firm and turn all assets into cash.
The present wave of mergers between insurance and non-
insurance firms is aggravated, to a large extent, by the fact that
non-insurance enterprises are facing a period of high capital
costs."' Therefore, industry is searching for alternative sources of
capital which have a lower market cost. What industry sees is that
insurance company funds are or can be very low cost (negative
c9st?) in nature.' 9 The insurance company is viewed as a levered
1OAt the beginning of 1968, property-liability shares were quoted at ar
average of only ten times net investment income and less than book value. Brats
INsURANCE STocu TRsENS (1969).
17'Excess surplus" or "surplus-surplus" refers to that amount of net wordi
which is thought to be greater than needed for the amount of insurance (an.
hence debt) being underwritten. Such companies are referred to as underlevere
or overcapitalized.
18 There are a number of motives, of course, for merger, but high capita
costs are very significant.
19 The parenthetical insert in the sentence reflects the obvious conditioz
under which the insurer raises investment funds and realizes a profit on the func
(Continued on next page]
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investment trust in which policyholders are putting up substantial
amounts of cash as a by-product of purchasing the insurance. To
the extent that firms can make use of this capital, they can do
so at a relatively low cost.
Thus what one had was the insurance industry with its stock
selling below liquidating value, overcapitalized, and a ready
source of low cost funds, but restricted as to the types of invest-
ments it could make. When other segments of the economy are in
need of capital funds, and when these capital funds are expensive,
the resulting conclusion is almost foregone: merger through the
holding company.
Many in the insurance industry, including regulators, are con-
cerned with the resulting financial reorganizations and their
implications for the operation of insurance companies in the
future. They view the drawing down of excess surplus as in-
tensifying an already dangerous capacity problem. Differences in
perception abound, but we do not see dangers to solvency. Indeed,
what assets are left supporting insurance may be used more
efficiently, relative to the past. We believe the major implication
of the trend is not so much the solvency matter as it is the profi-
tability matter. Insurance must be considered as profitable, but
perhaps not with respect to particular lines of business.
Will the movements afoot in the industry result in more
capacity? We hardly think so. True, there will be management
changes arising from the merger-holding company movement.
Perhaps this will include a healthy infusion of new and better
management philosophy. And undoubtedly, there will be comple-
mentarity of financial operations. However, the movement does
not seem to envision one management taking over from another
to "turn around" the "unprofitable" insurance business. There
may be additional insurance written, but it will be more of the
same type; insurers in the merger-holding company arrangement
will be competing for shares of the same business which is cur-
rently being written, and not aggressively underwriting new
business. We do not believe that the insurance companies, as part
of these conglomerates, will be operated to maximize conglom-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)




erate profitability without the interests of the public, but merger
managers are aware that insurers have the unique capability of
raising capital funds from other than capital markets at reasonably
low cost. Managements cannot be expected to jeopardize the low
cost feature by experimentation with new forms or areas of under-
writing. Curtailing insurance activities until they are profitable
is logical. If the unprofitability is perceived as a long-run phe-
nomenon, management's duty to stockholders is to remove a
portion, if not all of their assets from insurance commitments to
more profitable commitments.
SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS
We are forced to conclude that lack of capacity in the in-
surance industry is not based on the inherent profitability of the
risks which are currently underwritten or on a fear of insolvency.
Investors in insurance companies must be considered to have
maximizing motives which are similar to investors in other in-
dustries. Such motives, while not anti-social, have resulted in
capital movements away from support of insurance underwriting
in favor of more profitable or less complicated ventures. Some may
consider this to be an abrogation of social responsibility, to the
extent that investors and management have decided to limit theii
commitments to furnishing insurance, aggresively, or otherwise,
But, we perceive the investment market as a resource allocatoi
which is currently undertaking change. In large part, this chang(
may be triggered by perceived lack of profits, inertia of marketinc
forces, impatience with the (price) regulatory process, competi
tion, and other factors which represent the growing and compleo,
environment of the industry. We find nothing surprising in thi!
development. It involves no more than classic opportunity costs
On the other hand, we think the industry collectively is noi
aware of the consequences of its Adam Smith-type decision
making, or if it is, it is unable to act collectively about the con
sequences without a serious time lag. Individual decision makin,
by insurers has a collective impact. We see it reflected in the auto
mobile insurance segment of the industry in the rash of proposal:
in recent years-being considered far more seriously than in th4
past-for a modification of the means of providing payments t(
victims of accidents. The industry is involved causally in this mat
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ter, at least in part. We see it as well in the property insurance
segment of the industry in plans-currently operating-which pro-
vide a market for risks otherwise not placeable in the "normal"
markets. These plans came on-stream after Congress in mid-1968
passed legislation which established reinsurance mechanisms at the
federal level if the industry, in turn, established vehicles for
insuring risks which could not be placed in the normal market.
State programs have developed, as have urban area plans. We
have also seen nuclear liability insurance, foreign credit insurance,
mortgage guarantee insurance programs, among others, develop
under federal auspices. From this pattern, the industry must realize
that its decision-making, when it is deemed to create, to contribute
to, or to reflect an inability to respond to critical insurance prob-
lems, will result in national and state solutions.
It is not exactly correct to note that in the past the insurance
industry has solved its critical problems by joining together with
government to attain social goals. Government has enjoined in-
dustry to solve its problems. There are some who have every con-
viction that a similar pattern will develop in automobile in-
surance. But the reasons for government partnership in the past
have generally been because the risks insured have been un-
predictable and catastrophic, not because insurers were unwilling
to underwrite for profit reasons which now seems to be the case.
The automobile problem seems clearly to involve this un-
willingness (as did the medical care for the aged problem). The
distinctive aspect of the automobile problem is that any future
partnership involves a good portion of the industry's premiums,
whereas previous partnerships have not appreciably concerned the
industry's premiums. Thus, a partnership involves serious prece-
dence with respect to the revenues of the industry and the insured
and uninsured segments of the market.
